Abstract
Introduction
Visegrad -a village rising on the hill, on the banks of the Danube in Hungary. The rich history of this place, especially the kings of Hungary -Charles Robert, Poland -Casimir III the Great, Czech -John the Blind and the rulers of Bavaria, Saxony and Moravia meeting there in 1335 and 1338 created the foundations for the Prime Minister of Hungary -Jozsef Antall and the presidents of Czechoslovakia -Vaclaw Havel and the Republic of Poland -Lech Walesa also meeting there. As a result of the agreement in 1991, the Visegrad Triangle was created.
The main theme of the article is to examine the origins, creation and functioning of the so-called Visegrad Group. The authors try to draw attention to the aspects relating to events that had a particular impact in history on the emergence, establishment and interaction of these three and then four states in Central Europe.
The need to write this article stems from the fact that the events of recent years, primarily the geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe, Russia's war with Georgia in 2008, the still unresolved conflict with Ukraine, the issue of terrorism, refugees and organised crime, threaten the security of the Central European region. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, jointly working together as part of the Visegrad Group, can strengthen the guarantees of their own security in the European Union and NATO. But this is not an easy process. Taking into account the difficult history and divisions that accompanied the signing of the Declaration in Visegrad, it required a lot of negotiations, disputes and, consequently, concessions to develop consensus among the V4 countries.
The issues that the authors raise in this article deal with:
• Yalta order and coexistence in the Soviet sphere of influence; • The fall of the Iron Curtain -the joint efforts of the Visegrad Group countries for integration with NATO and the EU; • The Visegrad Group's operations in the Western security system -selected projects of V4 within NATO and the European Union.
Taking all the above into consideration, the publication probably does not present a comprehensive picture of the new international situation in this part of Europe, but indicates a variety of problems that the Visegrad Group encounters in its work. What's more, the Western security system, in which the group operates, requires the commitment and adjustment of their decisions that would comply with generally accepted principles and values prevailing in the European Union and NATO. As a consequence, the analysis of the events that take place in the Western security system and cover the Visegrad Group, demands reliable and accurate observation from the authors.
Owing to this, the publication puts forward complex factors connected with the activity of the Visegrad Group in the European arena in the face of constantly changing international reality.
Yalta order -co-existence in the Soviet sphere of influence
The Yalta Conference in the Crimea in February 1945 launched the establishment of a new international order. Post-Yalta order was established by three leaders of the victorious powers in World War II: Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The Crimean peninsula became the place where a crucial decision for the future of Central and Eastern Europe was taken. Later, it turned out, it became fundamental for relations between the military and political forces in Europe. The Soviet yoke covered the countries east of the Elbe, and the phenomenon was most accurately described by Winston Churchill, who used the term "iron curtain" 1 
(Map 1). (Map 1).
Accordingly, the states which the following article deals with, i.e. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were, in the period of post-Yalta order, under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and its communist government. In the next part of the publication, the authors make an attempt to present the consistency or inconsistency of the interests of these countries in the postwar period until the Autumn of Nations, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 -a symbol of the end of communism and two-bloc system in Europe. The characteristics of the foreign policy of these countries, which in the early nineties set up the Visegrad Triangle and later the Visegrad Group, will also allow the premises and the objectives which they adopted when they created the initiative of the alliance to be perceived.
The definition of "iron curtain" Winston Churchill usedon March 5, 1946 
Map 1. The political situation in 1955-1989
After the end of World War II, until March 1953, the jurisdiction over the states of the Soviet bloc was held by Generalissimo Joseph Stalin. His death shocked the entire community of the communist world, which also weakened relations between the USSR and the countries which were ruled by the political parties subordinate to Moscow. The year 1956 brought a political breakthrough in Poland. The public expressed opposition to Stalinism by their protests, which was met with Nikita Khrushchev's discontent, who was in Warsaw at that time. "The Polish October" could have led to the intervention of Soviet troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland, which, in the end, did not occur. The revisionism of communism in Poland got a lot of publicity abroad, the Hungarians proved to be particularly loyal to the Poles. The USSR was not as lenient towards Hungary as it was towards Poland. The demonstrations in Budapest in solidarity with the changes in Poland led to the outbreak of fighting on a large scale and, thus, to the military intervention of the Soviet Union troops 2 . Taking into consideration the events which occurred in Hungary, apart from the internal reasons that largely determined the incidents on the Danube 3 , the authors focus on external conditions. The "October detonator" in Poland is one of the most important ones. The aim, however, is not to present the course of the events of the military intervention in Hungary but to articulate the most important determinants of the bilateral relations that united the neighboring countries. The most important primarily include the anti-Soviet and anti-communist basis of the disturbances in the two countries. In the view of the Kremlin, Poland, together with Hungary undermined the hegemonic order in the region of Eastern Europe and, what is more, they dared to challenge the rules imposed by the Soviet Union 4 . Although there was no fighting with the Red Army in Poland, the events of that period showed that, in the societies of Central and Eastern Europe, there was a growing awareness of regaining independence and self-reliance. Despite the fact that these countries had to wait nearly three decades to escape Soviet oppression, it made the authorities in Moscow realise that it would bring about the slow stagnation of the communist system. Therefore, since the 1960s, the USSR Soviet began to lead in its spheres of influence with greater caution. The example of Hungary made the authorities in the Kremlin realise that they could not approve of more of these types of incidents in the block. This would more likely cause "a domino effect" in other countries. Therefore, the intervention of the Soviet Union had a preventive and not only a reactionary character and its function was to inform the other members of the soviet zone, that all manifestations of revolt would be suppressed by force 5 .
The third country in the region is Czechoslovakia, which, after World War II, was entirely subordinated to the USSR. This fact is not revealing considering the post-war situation in the region. The authors, however, point to the completely different circumstances from those of the above-mentioned countries. This is so because, since the end of the war, the communists had gained full power in Czechoslovakia. This meant that its economic and cultural policy, as well as its suppression system, did not practically differ from that of the Soviet Union. However, the system of implementing communism was different. The Soviet Union treated Czechoslovakia in a more "friendly" way. They withdrew troops from the area as early as 1948 and, in the case of Poland, this only took place in 1992 6 . Furthermore, it has to be remembered that the Polish and Hungarian societies were anti-Russian and anti-communist, as opposed to the Czechs and Slovaks 7 .
As a result, all the countries mentioned above were under the influence of the soviet protectorate until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Foreign policy and security policy in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia was fully dependent on the decisions of the communist superpower. The events of the 1950s showed that the USSR began to move away from the rigid and adventurous course which had been outlined by Joseph Stalin 8 . The methods of repression were tempered, however, and they did not abandon the tough policy, which was confirmed by the "Prague Spring" and the intervention in 1968 by Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia.
Taking into consideration the political reality in the times of "the cold war", the countries of Central and Eastern Europe believed that the most reasonable solution to the situation of being subordinate to the Soviet Union was to integrate. Joining forces and resources, developing a common foreign policy would enable to them become independent from the power in the Kremlin.
The strongest argument for the foundations of the emergence of the Visegrad Triangle in 1991 was the geographical location of these countries in the middle of the European continent. The possibility of dividing this part of Europe by the aforementioned "iron curtain" also had an influence on the creation of the Visegrad Triangle. Once more, in such a short time, Central Europe became a buffer zone between the West and the East, between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact. Such a position could have potentially become a source of tension and the area of possible armed conflict between opposing military alliances 9 .
Despite several attempts to subordinate Central and Eastern Europe entirely, the Soviet Union managed maintain its influence temporarily and merely superficially. With the end of a two-bloc division of the world, an economically declining Soviet Union began to walk away from Central Europe. The events in the late 1970s in Poland initiated the progress in the move to return "to Europe" under the slogan of "transformation". In addition, it was also the result of other circumstances, such as the events in June 1976, Karol Wojtyła's election as Pope and the establishment of "Solidarity" in 1980. In Hungary, the most stable country of the communist bloc, "goulash communism"
10 resulted in a change in the mood of society and, as in other countries of the "Autumn of Nations", the Hungarians began to introduce reforms which were leading towards the capitalist economy. After the "Prague Spring", with the purges and repressions against society, Czechoslovakia began to move back from the criticism of the authorities in Moscow. The circumstances of perestroika changed this approach. In addition, the events in Poland and Hungary led to the "velvet revolution", which, in consequence, made the communists give up power.
In an attempt to show the relations and connections between the states that formed the Visegrad Triangle in the early 1990s, it should be remembered that the idea of integration had its basis in bilateral agreements. Such a situation primarily originated in the cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance role of consolidation in ensuring their own security and their relationship with European security as such. Their aim was to be guided by equality, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. From the point of view of the whole soviet bloc, the necessity for consultation was significant, which enabled overcoming problems, working out solutions, as well as a common stand. Additionally, the states committed themselves to the principles of the UN Charter. The agreements also included regulations concerning the following fields: science and technology, the economy, culture, health, education, literature, art, radio, television, and many others.
Another argument for searching for the method of integration was the lack of a discussion forum within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The hegemony of the Soviet Union did not allow the structure of the alliance to be escaped from, much less to follow the example of NATO and the EEC, which were functioning efficiently. The repressions in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia resulted in the erosion of the current communist political system. It was also caused by the decomposition of state structures, as well as breaking off ideological, political, military and economic ties between the countries 12 . Despite signing bilateral agreements, they could not always be used to implement new projects. The concepts of symmetric subregional solutions, described colloquially as regionalism, constituted a method of dealing with the situation. Owing to regionalism, Central and Eastern Europe became a region which was strategically important in politics, both in the communist and in the capitalist bloc. People finally starting appreciating the distinctiveness of the region, which was similar with regard to the socio-economic structure, cultural identity with its common past, the perception of the same ideas and cultural trends 13 . The authors of this publication believe that, apart from the abovementioned arguments, there are other justified arguments made by Remigiusz Bierzanek, who underlined "natural closeness" and "political necessity" as well 14 . the components of the concept of regionalism are part of a dynamic process of the rapprochement of the participants in the international environment which was constituted by the quantitative and qualitative growth of the interaction and forming norms and international institutions" 15 . Taking into account all the above characteristic features of the East and Central European region, one may conclude that they indicated an inevitable integration.
The first clear symbol of institutionalisation of the cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was the Central European Initiative. Although, at the beginning, it was formed by Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy, soon it accepted Czechoslovakia, creating the so-called "Pentagonale". The group's objective was mainly to stabilise the relations in Central Europe, develop the Danube, transport connections modernisation, nuclear safety and formworking groups which would deal with other problems 16 . At the end of the 1980s, Zbigniew Brzeziński, referring to the initiatives put forward by Wladysław Sikorski and Edward Benes during World War II, advocated the initiative of reactivating the idea of creating a Polish and Czech federation 17 . Poland, at the beginning of the group's activity, was not welcome in its ranks, mainly because of its attitude towards Czechoslovakia. Vaclaw Havel, during a meeting in Bratislava in April 1990, stated that Poland can at best be a link between the South and the Nordic countries, because to all intents and purposes it fitted neither group 18 . In addition, the president of Czechoslovakia paid his first visit to the GDR and FRN, which disappointed public opinion in Poland and was a sign that an agreement between the two countries would not be easy to reach. Later, however, under the influence of the support given to Poland by Hungary and Italy, and especially the Italian foreign minister Gianni de Mechelisa, who, in 1991 in Parma, stated that "We must not leave Poland between the two powers in a situation when the creation of a pan-European security system is still quite distant 19 " he changed his mind, which resulted in Polish accession to the initiative, which was called "Hexagonale" at that time. Thanks to the Central European Initiative, a "Central European triangle" emerged. Despite the exchange of views on cooperation between the three countries, an attempt at institutionalization was still not made. Additionally, President Havel, when asked about the common future, stated that he was only interested in NATO, which was the only democratic and tested at the time institution that was able to guarantee security 20 . Over the course of time, the authorities in Czechoslovakia changed their attitude. The three of them initiated economic and military consultations. They were the beginning of a sub-regional cooperation mechanism, which, in the future, was to be independent of Comecon and the EEC. In reality, however, the countries tried by all possible means to "return to Europe" and avoid rivalry between each other to be first to join NATO structures and European Communities 21 .
Polish, Hungarian and Czech efforts to reach a common stance in Central Europe did not remain unnoticed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO member countries have openly began to take the initiative to strengthen cooperation. However, this was not the main reason for NATO's interest. In view of the forthcoming collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO sought to fill the gap created by the presence of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. The countries of the "Visegrad Triangle", thanks to the strongest economy in the region, the advancement of economic and social reforms, geographic proximity and the universality of the democratic processes, were able to fill this space 22 . Moreover, the idea of the creation of the Visegrad Triangle formed part of a new form of cooperation adequate to the situation after the collapse of the communist system. It should also be recognised that the process of trilateral integration, despite clear common characteristics which united these states, was not as simple as it might have seemed. The events in the past which occurred between particular countries, including territorial and ethnic problems and different political perception, are particularly conspicuous 23 . It is also important to remember the conflicts on the 0 W. Pawłowski, Trójkąt, sześciokąt i reszta Europy, "Polityka", 23.02.1991 r., s. 9.
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border of Hungary and Slovakia, the Sudeten question and the Polish-Czech issue 24 .
In conclusion, the second half of the twentieth century and, most of all, the events in the late e1980s, whwhose culmination was "the Autumn of Nations" with the ultimate collapse of the socialist system in Europe, showed how determined the countries were to abandon the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Of the many attempts to integrate Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, only the Visegrad Triangle identified common interests, goals and directions of foreign and security policy. Disagreement and, especially, Soviet repression towards Central and Eastern European countries had a negative influence on working out a common stance.
Due to state repression, jointly opposed by Moscow, which negatively affected the development of a unified position, the period of "post-Yalta order" in Central and Eastern Europe, at the beginning of the 1990s, has exposed the weakness of the communist system to integrate, manifested first in the Visegrad Triangle uprising and later in their accession to NATO and the EU.
The fall of the Iron Curtain -the joint efforts of the Visegrad Group countries for integration with NATO and the EU
The collapse of the real socialism system in the area of Central and Eastern European countries enabled this part of the continent to redefine its foreign policy towards the West. The platform to implement t pro-Western orientation was, firstly, the desire to eliminate economic and military structures, bringing together countries which were under the umbrella of the Soviet Union -the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact and, secondly, accession, and in the Proclamation of the Visegrad format was preceded by a phenomenon known as "new regionalism" which strengthened international cooperation in a specific geographic region in order to overcome divisions existing in Europe. Establishing regional cooperation by individual countries also resulted, and perhaps above all, in the multiplication of mutual benefits in the process of integration with Western Europe. In other words, countries with similar historical, cultural, social, economic and political identity, which were to adopt an identical platform of negotiations, in many respects, would become more visible in the international arena, and the consequence of their joint efforts would be the effect of synergy in striving for full integration with Western economic and security structures. Ibidem, s. 5-6.
• construction of a parliamentary democracy, a modern state of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, • the creation of a modern market economy, • inclusion in the full range of the European political and economic system, and systems of security and legislation 27 .
The most important goal of the member countries constituting the Visegrad Triangle was undoubtedly integration with Euro-Atlantic structures, which was confirmed by the title of the declaration itself. Analysing the goals contained in the above declaration, it can be considered that the implementation of the first four is a sine qua non for the full realisation of the latter.
In structural terms, the Visegrad Three had no institutional base. In connection with the division of Czechoslovakia into two countries: the Czech Republic and Slovakia Triangle changed its name to the Visegrad Group.
-----together with its neighbours from the region. In addition, Klaus was reluctant to accept Polish ambitions to speak with one voice on behalf of the entire Group 32 .
However, before the limitations of cooperation within the Group, it is necessary to pay attention to the actions taken up to this point by the member states and to indicate the results of this cooperation in the context of integration with NATO and the European Union.
One of the most striking successes of the Group was helping to dissolve the structures which made Visegrad states dependent on the Soviet Union, namely the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact. The talks at the level of the Political Consultative Committee -the highest political body of the Pact, held from June to November 1990, were really important from the perspective of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The common stance of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary enabled these countries to explain and agree on their needs in terms of security, and then spell it out to the policy-makers in the Soviet Union. Despite their relatively weak position at the beginning of the negotiations, the united front of the Central European countries caused them to become independent of Moscow and brought about the dismantling of the whole structure of the Warsaw Pact, and not just its restructuring 33 .
The dismantling of this structure led to the withdrawal of the Red Army units in the territories of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in1991 and Poland in 1993.
Coordination of the security policy of the Visegrad countries also contributed to the effective resistance to Moscow's pressure to include, in already signed bilateral agreements on friendship and cooperation between the member countries of Triangle and the Soviet Union, clauses prohibiting them from joining the structure of the "hostile" alliances. Despite the suspension of political cooperation within the Group, the annual tripartite meetings at the level of Defence Ministers were not abandoned (without the participation of the Czech Minister). The agenda of the meetings focused mainly on issues related to the Polish, Hungarian and Slovak road to membership in NATO and, consequently, the objections of the Russian Federation. Military cooperation also enabled the effective transformation of the armed forces to meet NATO standards 43 .
The intensification of the military cooperation came after the Madrid NATO summit on 8 June 1997 where it was decided that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join the Alliance. As a result, as early as in July 1997, at a meeting of the Group's defence ministers in Budapest, it was decided that regular, quarterly meetings at ministerial level were going to be held. In addition, deputy ministers and chiefs of staff were going to consult each other as well 44 .
The cooperation of the Visegrad countries in the context of NATO membership also included foreign ministers, who through regular consultations regarding -----of enlargement towards the east which gave rise to rivalry instead of the desired cooperation.
The Copenhagen criteria were formulated at the EU summit in June 1993. It was emphasised that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union would become members of the community after fulfilling the following conditions:
• they should remain stable institutions which guarantee the functioning of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minority rights, • they should ensure the functioning of an efficient market economy that would be able to face up to competition within the Union, • they should have the capacity to fulfill the obligations of membership in the Union, • they should be able to incorporate laws regulating the EU into national law 50 .
An example of the rivalry within the Group was lobbying the so-called "small enlargement" by the Hungarians. the Czech Republic and Slovakia is much less important for the general economy of these countries than is the case of Poland and Hungary, so the introduction of this transitional period would mean smaller losses for Prague and Bratislava than delayed accession 52 .
As mentioned before, it was the national interest which mainly determined the intensity of cooperation within the Visegrad Group. Undoubtedly, the common goal of each member of the Group was final integration with the EU on the best conditions. As a result, a fragmentary cooperation in the format of Visegrad was initiated on the levels of ministers, prime ministers or chief negotiators. The result of the meetings in the accession period was working out a common stance on the issue of organising the accession referendums. During the meeting in Krynica, in September 2002, the prime ministers of the four states agreed that they would be held one after another, starting from the state in which the support and the regulations on the validity of the referendum offered the greatest probability of ultimate success 54 .
Finally, the Visegrad Group countries, together with seven other countries, became members of the European Union on 1 May2004, which, along with membership of the North Atlantic Alliance, meant the final accomplishment of the objectives of the Declaration of 15 February 1991 which formed the format of Visegrad. The integration with NATO and the European Union situated Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in the sphere of influence of the Western security system, which contributed significantly to increasing the level of safety in these countries. A lot of factors contributed to this success and one was them was starting regional cooperation and the joint strive for aspirations and goals. Despite the differences and the limitation periods in the cooperation, the Visegrad Group proved to be an effective formula, demonstrating the ability of young democracies to take joint action to achieve the goals which had been set.
K. Gawron-Tabor, op. cit., s. 235. Ibidem. Ibidem, s. 257.
Visegrad Group's operations in the Western security system -selected projects of V4 within NATO and the European Union
Accession to the European Union and NATO constituted a test of loyalty, trust, decision-making and consensus on security issues in the region for the Visegrad Group countries. The projects undertaken within the V4 have not always had tangible results.
The greatest challenge for the countries of the Visegrad Group is to ensure military, economic and financial safety for its citizens. Faced with the still unresolved Ukrainian-Russian conflict, this task is extremely difficult. Russia's interference in eastern Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by the European Union have divided the V4 countries. The ban on exports of goods to the Russian Federation has become an economic challenge for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The connections which these countries have with the Russian companies investing in their area have been blocked, which led automatically to the suspension of Russian investments 55 . Russia takes advantage of the discrepancy in the Visegrad Group and such discrepancy confirms the lack of unity in the EU. A variety of opinions of Central European countries regarding the Russian Federation reveals that the risks are perceived differently, which, in the long term, impedes cooperation, particularly in the field of regional security.
Achieving membership in the European Union and NATO also poses a question about the meaning of the further functioning within the Visegrad group. The purpose which they achieved and the new reality meant that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had to set new directions. Therefore, several areas of mutual commitment were developed Among the most important areas were: economic, business, energy security, military cooperation, the influence on countries outside the EU, especially on countries in Eastern Europe (Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova), the Balkans and Caucasus, and technological cooperation.
In this part of the article, the authors draw attention to the joint ventures undertaken by the Visegrad countries for security in the framework of NATO and the European Union. These projects include defence cooperation, which was an essential element for the functioning of the Visegrad format since its inception. which can then be offered to the European Union and NATO as an instrument to achieve security and defence policy 61 .
One of such projects also implemented to emphasise the sustainability of the Visegrad Declaration, and especially to ensure the security of the region, is the Visegrad Battle Group within the European Union. The document setting it up was signed in March 2014 in Visegrád by the defence ministers of Poland, Hungary, The Czech Republic and Slovakia. The legitimacy of the creation of the battle group was reduced to deepening the cooperation in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union and also to the consistency of security policy towards the Russian Federation in cooperation with the United States 62 . In the authors' opinion, this decision, since the accession of the V4 countries to NATO and the EU, is the most important decision of a strategic character. Poland should determine the courses of action in the project. As a leader, with the biggest military and territorial potential, it must take responsibility for the effectiveness of the initiative.
The Visegrad EU Battle Group took over command on 1 January 2016. Its duty will last until 30 June 2016. The command group was formed in Cracow, in the Land Operations Center 63 . The Group has approximately 3.9 thousand soldiers, half of whom are Poles. The Czech Republic has approx. 800 soldiers, Hungary -approx. 600 and Slovakia -approx. 450. The task of the European Union Battle Group is to work for a period of from 30 to 120 days at a distance of 6000 km from Brussels. The group is supposed to act in humanitarian, stabilisation, peace enforcement, preventive missions.
The creation of a joint combat group within the European Union strengthened relationships among the "Visegrad Four" on t issues of shaping the security, developing defence policy and confirming the sense of further cooperation in Central Europe. in this field is natural gas. The events which occurred during the energy crises in 2006, and particularly in 2009, when Russia stopped gas supplies to Ukraine, convinced Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia of the necessity for diversification of "blue fuel". Furthermore, what these countries have in common is that they have gas supplies only from the Russian source and there is a lack of a common energy market, the system of main pipeline running east-west and geographical environment 66 . In the framework of energy cooperation and ensuring the security of natural gas supply, the states established a number of projects, which include:
• expanding the transmission infrastructure of natural gas, electricity and petroleum products -Energy Corridor North-South Corridor North -South consists of infrastructure projects in the field of gas, electricity and oil, which will link the markets of Central Europe with each other as well as from the western part of the continent. In the gas sector, the Corridor aims to create a coherent transmission network, consisting of pipelines and interconnectors, extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic coast. The corridor is also to extend the existing pipelines so that oil supplied to Europe via the Baltic Sea or the Adriatic Sea could then be freely transported across Central Europe. As for the electricity sector, the most important thing is the construction of high voltage power lines that will connect the Baltic countries -which are still lonely islands -with the rest of Europe. Infrastructure, which in effect created, will be essential to ensure energy security in Central Europe. The entire European Union, which thanks to the implementation of the corridor will increase its competitiveness, will benefit from strengthened national industry and facilitating the coordination of strategic objectives.
In the region of Central Europe, The European Investment Bank co-finances, among others, the Hungarian-Croatian interconnector, modernisation of the electricity network in the Czech Republic and Hungary as well as construction of installations in the area of renewable energy in the Czech Republic and Poland (wind farms). It is worth noting that the concept of the North-South Corridor, mentioned above, is designed to form, respectively, the Polish and Croatian LNG terminals and the Nabucco pipeline 70 . The immediate success of this investment was receiving the first delivery of gas from Qatar at the end of 2015. The LNG terminal in Świnoujście is an important element of Polish energy security as well as the V4 countries. With the new pipelines, interconnectors virtual reverse on the Yamal pipeline, as well as the underground warehouses and its own production, the terminal will strengthen Poland's gas independence and prevent crises in the supply of Russian -----natural gas. The investment will enable the receipt of gas by sea from virtually any direction in the world; thus it will make other countries of the Visegrad Group independent of the Russian Federation.
Despite many areas in which the V4 countries develop cooperation in energy security issues, there are also many differences regarding the common energy policy. A different policy towards the Russian Federation should be particularly emphasised. Poland and the Czech Republic are able to cope without Russian imports of raw materials, while Hungary and Slovakia are almost 100% dependent on them. This makes the energy policy of these countries relatively different from the Czech or Polish; moreover, it could be argued that it is friendly towards Russia. Another convergent issue in the Visegrad Group is Hungarian policy towards Russia and the South Stream gas pipeline. The Russians presenting an attractive energy offer to Hungarians led to the withdrawal of Hungarian companies from the implementation of the Nabucco project and the weakening of Visegrad cooperation. The South Stream project was suspended thanks to the European Commission and because of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The whole episode may halt investments in the North-South Energy Corridor. This will happen because of Hungary, which is going to block the connector to the planned LNG gas terminal on the Croatian island of Krk and gas from the Caspian Sea from the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. The above situation may create a threat to Hungarian total reliance on Russian gas, and hence the expansion of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście by Poland, which will become the only alternative for the Visegrad Group
71
. Finally, it must also be noted that cooperation in the field of energy security of the Visegrad Group countries has a significant impact on energy companies, which are able to change political and economic decisions reached at the state level with their internal policy.
Regional cooperation within the Visegrad Group implies many events which have a positive or a negative effect on the image of Central Europe in the European Union. After more than a decade of EU common experience, we can say that the Central European region should be identified with the policy pursued by Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In particular, the issues relating to W. Jakóbik, Węgry uderzają w plany Grupy Wyszehradzkiej na korzyść Rosji, http:// biznesalert.pl/jakobik-wegry-uderzaja-w-plany-grupy-wyszehradzkiej-na-korzysc-rosji/ [dostęp: 03.01.2016 r.].
-----security in the face of the unpredictable Russian neighbour should tighten mutual relations between the four countries. The unified voice of 65 million citizens of other European Union countries should provide greater strength and are the token of the Central European rank. The ability to work out a common position, despite many differences and sometimes conflicting interests on matters of strategic importance for the security of the EU, may strengthen the position of the region. However, there are differences that arise in the policies of the states. Perhaps this is because the Visegrad Group does not have institutionalised cooperation, perhaps because the story and the yoke of Soviet domination does not enable a return to dependence even on the closest ally. One can trace more aspects that will undermine the unity of the V4. In conclusion, the authors believe, only cooperation, following the example of the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries, will make it possible to develop strong positions in the European Union and NATO, which will enable the Visegrad Group countries to remain safe and prevent their violation.
Summary and conclusions
The provisions of the Yalta Conference of February 1945 placed Central Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence, effectively separating Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary from Western European and transatlantic integration processes. As the result of the implementation of communist ideas in these countries, they had been included into the military and economic structures dominated by the Soviet Union -the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact. Their co-existence in the Soviet zone became a source of regional cooperation, which was then the basis for the proclamation, on 15 February 1991, of the Visegrad Triangle.
The main aim of the Visegrad cooperation was inclusion in Western economic systems and security through integration with the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. Due to the low level of institutionalisation, cooperation was exposed to limitations resulting from the political situation in the Member States. The result of the divergent positions of political forces in the Czech Republic and -----Slovakia, relative to regional cooperation, was a period of low cooperation and the individual character of participation in the accession process.
The enlargement of NATO and the European Union to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary was the achievement of the objectives contained in the Declaration of 15 February 1991 appointing the Visegrad Group. The emergence of new challenges and threats in the early twenty-first century and the measurable benefits from regional cooperation resulted in the extension and redefinition of the purpose of the existence of the Visegrad Group, functioning now within the European Union and NATO.
The article presents the joint commitment of the Visegrad countries in raising the level of security of the Union and the Alliance as a whole, which included: efforts to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, energy policy coordination and the development of defence cooperation, expressed in the Long-term vision of deepening cooperation in defenve.
In the face of negative processes a disintegration affecting the shape of the international security environment, coordination of the Visegrad Group at the political level and strengthening defecse cooperation will be crucial to effectively counteract new threats. Establishing a Visegrad Battle Group is the desired direction of cooperation, the experience of which could be used in forming the "Spreadhead" land component of NATO. However, the negative aspect of cooperation is now since the beginning of its existence, the dominance of individual national interests over the interests of the entire Group. This is now reflected in the different stance of members of the Group towards the policy of the Russian Federation.
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